Variety of Cyber Democracy from the Asian View of Human Being

Takeshi Sakade

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Abstract

This paper highlights the current threats to civil liberties such as freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and privacy, which include private corporations, government censorship, cyberattacks, fake news, and privacy breaches. The paper examines the crisis of social and political openness in the online space that citizens and internet companies should enjoy, and the need for multi-stakeholders to realize this. Actor-network theory, based on Bruno Latour's ANT, discusses the nature of democracy in online space in societies with Confucian cultural principles that differ from Western cultural principles. Multi-stakeholderism is a framework that involves organizations and individuals from different positions in society, such as businesses, consumers, investors, workers, and NPOs, who participate in the multi-stakeholder process, cooperate, and play their respective roles. The organizations and individuals that hold the key to solving these problems are called "stakeholders". A "multi-stakeholder process" is a consensus-building framework in which a wide variety of stakeholders participate on an equal footing and work together to solve problems.

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Introduction

The author of *Homo Deus*: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Yuval Noah Harari, noted at the 2018 Davos World Economic Forum that while humanity has viewed democracy as the final model for political systems, other "digital dictatorships" are likely to emerge. Democracy works by distributing information and decision-making power among many institutions and individuals, while dictatorship is the opposite and concentrates on the 20th century. Distributed computing is one of the main reasons democracies generally prevail over dictatorships because it outperforms centralized computing.

In the 21st century, new technological revolutions, particularly AI and machine learning, might swing the pendulum in opposite directions, Harari explained. It could make centralized computing far more efficient than distributed computing. And if democracy cannot adapt to these new conditions, then humans will live under the rule of digital dictatorships, he added. Data is the raw material of the 21st century, replacing the "oil" of the 20th century. In terms of the exploitation of personal information, the privacy risks of big data, IoT, and AI include the following: first, personal information is collected, analyzed, and shared without our knowledge. Second, with big data, the greater the amount and type of personal information, the more it can be broken down and used in different ways.

The more comfortable we are with Internet-based search, shopping, and community, the more individuals worry about data breaches, the more hesitant they are about the government's call to register for a personal number card, and the more companies are forced to spend huge sums of money to defend against cyber-attacks. Could there be a safer, more secure, and freer cyber society? The development of digital-twin technology requires the formation of a pluralistic and stable order in humans and cyberspace that can respond to this trend.

I.   The Difference in Democracy in the Western World

The US Digital Enclosure Model

In exchange for providing their services, the U.S. IT platformers learn about users' privacy and all the data about them—what they read, what they buy, whom they talk to, what they eat, and where they live—and use that data to make money (Galloway, 2020). In Scott Galloway's "Red Knight/Blue Knight" theory, the basic business model of the Red Knights (Amazon, Facebook, and Google) is to distribute products below cost and sell users' behavioral data to other companies for a fee. Android smartphones send 1,200 data points to Google every day. As a result, users receive services in exchange for their privacy. YouTube videos are free, but Google collects viewing data (Galloway, 2020:64-68).

In contrast, the basic business model of "blue-knight" companies like Apple is to sell goods at a price higher than their cost of production. An Apple iPhone costs $400 but sells for $1200, and the iPhone sends 200 data points a day to Apple (Apple insists that it does not use this data to make money). Users also pay a lot of money to ensure their privacy and status. Moreover, Netflix charges a fee for streaming video. Apple also receives $12 billion a year for making Google the default search engine on iOS (Galloway, 2020:64-69).

EU GDPR Model

The EU is a standard and regulation power with 500 million people, it is the world's largest economy, and the size of its market gives it influence in shaping global standards and regulations in areas such as corporate mergers, accounting standards, environmental protection, and bioethics (Endo and Suzuki (2020:4-5)). Suzuki refers to the ability to ensure and make effective the inducement or regulation ("regulation") of certain economic, social, and political actors to act in accordance with rules and requirements ("standards") that they mutually recognize, share, and act accordingly toward other actors.

According to Endo and Suzuki (2020: 20-21), the ability to set an agenda, persuasiveness (impartiality and universality), the ability to act collectively, and market gravity are the key factors. As a regulatory empire (Endo and Suzuki (2020:28-29), first, it forces countries outside its imperial

domain to accept the various regulations of market activity that it implements; next, it does not directly use military force or other material power (violence); and lastly, the party subject to regulation accepts it voluntarily, creating a voluntary subordinate state. universality of the norm.

U.S.-European clash over data privacy

The U.S.-European clash over data privacy will be discussed as we examine the SWIFT case, the Safe Harbor invalidation decision, the Google Spain decision, and the Schmules II decision. First, the SWIFT case was as follows: SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Telecommunications) has over 11,000 financial institutions in over 200 countries and it is the standard for money transfers worldwide, but because it is based in Belgium, it must comply with the principles of the EU Data Protection Directive. In June 2006, it was reported that the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (under the Patriot Act and a Presidential Executive Order) was monitoring bank transfer data to prevent transfers to terrorists. The European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the U.S. Treasury for violating the basic principles of the EU Data Protection Directive (Miyashita, 2017: 136-138).

Second, the Safe Harbor invalidation decision was: In July 2000, the European Commission decided that companies comply with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and other Safe Harbor Principles established by the U.S. The Department of Commerce for the transfer of personal data from the European Economic Area to the U.S. provided "an adequate level of protection" in October 2015. The EU Court of Justice ruled that the Safe Harbor decision was invalid in the same year. The ruling generally prohibited many U.S. companies from transferring customer and employee data from the EU to the U.S. (Miyashita, 2021:121).

Henceforth, the Google Spain decision focused on the "right to be forgotten." In May 2014, a local newspaper published an article about a man living in Spain whose house was auctioned off because he continued to default on his social security payments. When this digitized article was still listed as a Google search result more than a decade later, therefore, the man asked Google to

remove the information. The Spanish Data Protection Agency ordered Google to remove the search results. However, Google disagreed and appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Union, which upheld the man's appeal. The Google-Spain decision is a case where the individual's right to privacy and data protection prevails over the search engine operator's economic interests and the right of citizens to access their information. The EU Court's decision is not just an EU issue; the removal of the domains is also effective worldwide, including Japan and the U.S. The U.S. objected as follows: The EU ruling "taints the Web" (Washington Post). Under the American tradition of freedom of expression, the publication of "truthful information" is strongly guaranteed. Even rape victims in the US are not allowed to remove information if it is true (Miyashita (2017: 112-113,118-119).

Lastly, the Schmules II decision involved U.S.-EU political negotiations over a new EU political framework that would allow U.S. companies operating in the EU to transfer personal data from the EU. In July 2016, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Commission agreed to a new framework called "Privacy Shield." It is a 1998 EU data protection directive that provides for the appointment of an ombudsperson with an independent supervisory authority within the U.S. The 1998 EU Data Protection Directive provides for the appointment of an ombudsperson with an independent supervisory authority within the U.S. Department of State to prevent indiscriminate and bulk access to personal data by the U.S. government and other agencies, even for security purposes, and various remedies, became an issue with Microsoft's collection and transfer of Spanish employees' data to the U.S. (Miyashita (2021: 126-129).

The U.S.-European clash over data was a clash of ideas and philosophies of privacy culture and privacy rights behind the law. The U.S. privacy law was based on liberty, and the guarantees of liberty were (1) notice to the individual, (2) opportunity to choose, (3) guarantee of access to data by the individual, (4) security, and (5) remedies. On the other hand, the European privacy law was based on "dignity." In April 2016, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was enacted. Let's understand the U.S.-EU data friction as a "regulatory tussle." Drezner said that in today's world, only the U.S. and the EU can be called "regulatory superpowers" capable of creating global rules. The prerequisite for a regulatory superpower is a domestic (intra-regional) market

that combines enormous size and non-fragility; Japan, India, and China do not fit the bill (Suda (2021:5-6)). In terms of digital taxation (Kaneko (2021:181-183)), corporate income taxes for internationally active companies such as GAFA are structured so that only profits attributable to physical locations such as factories and branches (permanent establishment PE) can be taxed in the source country, and the US IT sector's effective tax rate is 9.5% (the average for multinationals is 23.2%), and the digital services tax is still under discussion. The European Commission frequently fines Google for competition law violations.

Cybersecurity and privacy

What is an "open and secure cyberspace"? Cybersecurity is "making cyberspace safe from threats" (Suda (2021:145)). The economic motivation for the U.S. to pursue "open and secure cyberspace" possibly that the U.S. is where IT platform companies such as GAFA are headquartered. For digital companies to operate globally, they need an "open and secure cyberspace" environment where data can be exchanged across borders. (Suda (2021:152-153)) The EU's "Cybersecurity Strategy" (2013) is about "open, safe, and secure cyberspace". Whereas the EU is proactive on the free flow of data in general, it takes a cautious stance on the cross-border transfer and use of personal data and is considering measures to prevent the transfer of personal data to the United States (①153-154).

II.　　The Differences in Approaches to Democratize the Middle East between the U.S. and Europe

Differences in Approaches to Democratization between the U.S. and Europe

From the perspective of the differences between the U.S. and European approaches to democracy promotion in the Middle East, let us examine the variation in values regarding democracy and human rights between the U.S. and Europe. The European country's cold-hearted treatment of the

U.S. concept of democratization in the Middle East can be attributed to diplomatic factors such as the rift between France, Germany, and the U.S. which persisted since the beginning of the war in Iraq along with the dissatisfaction that the U.S. has not given the highest priority to peace in Palestine in Middle East affairs. However, it can also be argued that at the heart of this conflict lies the difference in approach between the U.S. and Europe in promoting democracy. To explore the distinction and the European approach to democracy promotion, we will go back and examine the EU's efforts to support democracy in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War, namely the Barcelona Process.

Kopstein organizes the difference between U.S. and European views of democracy and approaches to democracy promotion, with ~~as~~ the U.S. taking a "bottom-up" approach while Europe takes a "top-down" approach. He explained that this difference in approach lies behind the conflict between the U.S. and Europe in promoting democracy in the Middle East and that is clearly expressed in their different interpretations of the 1989 regime collapse in Eastern Europe, as follows: The U.S. interpreted the 1989 revolution as a bottom-up movement, a decision by civil society to overthrow dictators and transform regimes into market economies. Once the Berlin Wall fell, democracy inevitably emerged from the dust of the old regime. According to this interpretation, the process of regime changes in the 1990s was merely an epilogue to the main event of 1989. Europe, on the other hand, saw the events of 1989 as essentially a top-down phenomenon, with the Kremlin, not the streets of Warsaw or Budapest, as the real stage for the events of 1989. The determination of Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Soviet Union, to end the Cold War itself made the regime change possible. From a European perspective, 1989 was merely a prologue to history, and efforts to promote democracy began in earnest in the 1990s, when the European Union supported regime change in Eastern Europe. European democracy support was not directed at civil society per se but at governments, using EU accession negotiations as an incentive to build democratic institutions (Kopstein (2006:86-91); Youngs (2004)).

EU - Top-Down Approach

The EU's approach to supporting democratization in the Middle East has similarities to the EU's support for democratization in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe through the EU's eastward enlargement. The EU imposed the Copenhagen Criteria, acceptance of the acquis Communautaire, and fulfilment of 31 accession criteria on the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe as conditions for their accession to the EU, so the Copenhagen Criteria were imposed. In June 1993, the European Council set three accession conditions for the Copenhagen criteria: 1) political criteria (democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights); 2) economic criteria (market economy); and 3) ability to take on the obligations of membership.

The 31 accession criteria covered everything from the free movement of persons, services, and agriculture to public finance, the judiciary, employment, and foreign affairs, which represented a far-reaching restructuring of the states as well as the societies of the Eastern European countries. In order to reap the economic benefits of EU membership, Eastern European governments competed with each other to reform their societies to meet the criteria. Thus, the EU's stabilization of the periphery through the introduction of democracy and the market economy took the path of inducing the governments to achieve the standards of democracy and the market economy while inducing them to join and gain access to the EU. Democracy promotion there focused on helping the governments of the target countries introduce democracy (Haba (2004:48-49)).

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has positioned the southern Mediterranean region, including the Middle East, as a strategic point for immigration, energy supply, and trade, and has sought to strengthen relations with the region, including the expansion of aid and trade. The EU has identified the southern Mediterranean region, including the Middle East, as a strategic point for immigration, energy supply, and trade. The Mediterranean region refers to the 12 countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus. It differs from the "Middle East and North Africa" classification used by the United Nations, the World Bank, and other U.S.-led organizations.

In November 1995, the 15 EU member states and the 12 MED countries and regions signed the Barcelona Declaration. The Barcelona Declaration pledged political, economic, and social cooperation, with the creation of a free trade area by 2010. The EU countries and the 12 MED

countries participated and initiated discussions on trade, development, and political reforms, known as the "Barcelona Process." The association agreements were negotiated individually with each of the MED countries to promote political, economic, and social cooperation. The content of the individual association agreements included political conditionality, such as respect for fundamental human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Suzui characterizes the strategic goal as "the deepening of integration between the EU-MED and within the MED on the economic basis of the creation of a free trade area through the progress of the Barcelona Process and the transfer of the EU legal system through this process" (Suzui (2005), Uchida (2005)).

America's "bottom-up" approach

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the G.W. Bush administration promoted the "expansion of democracy" in the Middle East as the most important foreign policy issue, in parallel with the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, as the main countermeasure in the "war on terror". On September 11, 2001, after the terrorist attacks, the G.W. Bush administration promoted the "expansion of democracy" in the Middle East as the most important foreign policy issue, along with the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, as the main countermeasure in the "war on terror". It can be said that the U.S. has pursued the expansion of democracy as a foreign policy principle since its independence and founding, but its recent democracy promotion diplomacy is unique in that it aims to transform the social structure of the target countries.

As explained by President George W. Bush, the U.S. concept of democratization in the Middle East is a "generational" challenge", which means that regardless of short-term changes in policy focus, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of democracy promotion diplomacy as a new policy system. There are three main interpretations of the G.W. Bush administration's democracy promotion diplomacy, depending on whether one understands it more as a philosophy or as a policy instrument. The first interpretation understands democracy promotion as a principle and goal of U.S. foreign policy per se. This would include such axiomatic statements as

"democracies do not go to war with each other" and "terrorism does not occur in democracies. In his theory of "democratic peace," Russet states that conflicts between democracies tend to be resolved peacefully through negotiation and mediation (Russet (1996:1-3)). Ikenberry also describes U.S. democracy promotion as "more likely when other countries-especially great powers-are democracies rather than nondemocracies because they pursue their national interests or are in an environment that is more conducive to democracy."

The first interpretation characterizes it as a liberal grand strategy, recognizing that "the ability of the United States to pursue its national interests, reduce security threats, and strengthen a stable political order is enhanced when other countries' great powers are democracies rather than nondemocracies" (Ikenberry, 2006:136). The next sees democracy promotion as advocating "democratic expansion" as a rationale or rhetoric for intervention that masks America's external "imperial" agenda. Lastly, it understands U.S. democracy promotion more narrowly as a means of intervention to overthrow regimes without the use of military force. This understanding emphasizes the role of American nonprofit organizations in "color revolutions" in former Soviet bloc countries, such as the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

On September 11, 2001, in the aftermath of the attacks, the Bush Administration, along with the war on terrorism, promoted democratization in the Middle East region to prevent the outbreak of terrorism. In November 2003, in his NED (National Endowment for Democracy) 20th Anniversary speech, President Bush declared the "Advancement of Freedom in the Middle East" as the new U.S. strategy after the Iraq War.

This new strategy was announced externally by Vice President Cheney in a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2004. In late February 2004, the London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat published a draft of the "Greater Middle East Plan, " a plan that was to be published in July of that year in Sea Island (U.S.A.). At the end of February 2004, Al Hayat newspaper published a draft of the "Great Middle East Plan, "a draft declaration on the democratization of the Middle East, at a summit to be held in Sea Island, U.S.A., in July of the same year. Arab countries showed their opposition with Saudi Arabia and Egypt sending a joint letter to the Bush administration opposing the plan. In the face of such opposition to the "advance

of freedom" strategy of the Arab countries, the cooperation of the EU countries, which are allies of the USA and have strong diplomatic and economic influence in the Middle East, was indispensable to promoting the Middle East democratization plan, and the European agreement to contribute to the Middle East democratization as a joint US-European project was necessary before the summit in July. The agreement of the European side to promote the democratization of the Middle East as a joint U.S.-European project was necessary. However, the European response to the plan was extremely tepid (Youngs [2004:2-5]).

In a speech in London on May 24, 2004, EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten warned against the U.S. plan to democratize the Middle East, saying, "Promoting democracy is not like making instant coffee. The disagreement between U.S. and European democracies, between "bottom-up" and "top-down" approaches to democracy, can be seen as a factor in the June 9 Sea Island Summit. The Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Partnership Initiative was announced at the same event. The announcement of the BMENA Partnership Initiative can be seen as a turning point in the realization of the U.S. concept of democratizing the Middle East. As a result, the U.S. and Europe have agreed to work together to promote democracy in the Broader Middle East and North Africa as a joint project.

However, as a principle for promoting the partnership, the U.S. has stated that "the success of reform depends on the target region itself, and change must not be imposed from the outside. Each country is unique, and this diversity must be respected. Our engagement must respond to local conditions. This passage suggests that the degree of respect for the autonomy of Arab governments was a point of contention between the U.S. and Europe (Wittes (2004:76-78)).

The "trap" of liberalizing authoritarian regimes

Many authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have not only failed to contain radical Islamic ideology but have also encouraged anti-Western sentiment as an outlet for domestic grievances. The Bush administration sought to address this by extending the boundaries of U.S. democracy to

the Middle East and the Islamic world. The essence of this was to create channels for democratic institutions to function as voices of dissent against the order that would contribute to social improvement. A review of the democratization process in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, the countries at the center of the U.S. initiative to democratize the Middle East, shows that in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein's rule was removed and national elections were held under direct U.S. control, Shiite Islamic forces grew. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both countries have been under U.S. pressure for democratization and political reform, although to different degrees due to differences in political structures, but both have faced the political rise of groups with religious ideological backgrounds under such democratic institutions. Since 2005, the governments in both countries have shifted from democratization to repression as they watch the general decline of U.S. influence in the Middle East. In this political process, the liberal political forces that the U.S. initially hoped for have failed to organize the population through democratic institutions, including elections. Regarding this process, Brumberg points to the "liberalized tyranny trap," in which non-liberal Islamists become the dominant opposition force while Democrats are buried between despotic leaders and Islamists (Brumberg (2002:57)).

Let us examine this process from the perspective of what kind of structural changes the U.S. approach to democratization has brought to societies under authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have different characteristics from the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes that O'Donnell characterized in Latin American countries and through their analysis of Syria and Iraq. Aoyama and Sakai characterized authoritarian regimes in the Middle East as "soft" authoritarian rule. They stated that the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, which are republics, have divided their power structures into an "official" part and an "unofficial" part, with the latter taking control of the physical apparatus of violence that forces society into submission while trying to make the various groups that makeup society participate in the former as much as possible, thus making society as a whole dependent on the state" (Sakai and Aoyama (2005)). Hirschman also saw authoritarianism as "an attempt to exclude citizens from the public sphere and to concentrate people's lives solely in the private sphere" (Yano [2004:173]). From this perspective, the "bottom-up approach" of the U.S. created a channel through which objections that

had been suppressed under authoritarian regimes in the direction of public action could erupt through the public channel of democratic institutions. However, this mechanism does not seem to have produced diplomatic results for the United States. The historian Hobsbawm describes U.S. democracy promotion as "not only Don Quixote-like but dangerous," because it ultimately only exacerbates ethnic conflicts and causes national divisions (Hobsbawm (2004)). The U.S. pressure for democratization has led the peoples of the Middle East to turn to public action. The question now is whether these public actions will break out of the "liberalization trap of authoritarian regimes" and reconstruct a public space different from authoritarianism.

Domestically, American democracy has functioned as a fundamental principle uniting the nation through a process of catabolism and assimilation. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a clear challenge to the U.S. hegemonic order, arising from the gap between the expansion of the sphere of influence beyond its borders through imperialization and the lack of a sense of imperial self.

In restructuring the international order after the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration sought to address this by extending the boundaries of American democracy into the Islamic Middle East. The essence of this was to create channels for democratic institutions to function as voices of dissent against the order that would contribute to social betterment. Whether or not political and economic stability can be brought to the "imperial" international order through democracy and economic prosperity will largely depend on the success of this attempt.

II.   Digital Democracy vs. Digital Dictatorship

Can elections in democracies be manipulated?

With respect to China, the emerging group of digital despots controlled by censorship, which some have accused of being a totalitarian prison state and likened to Orwell's *1984*, what about the U.S. and other Western nations whose elections are the basis of democratic government? What about Western nations? Does American democracy work? In March 2018, the news that personal data held by Facebook was used by the Trump campaign in the 2016 presidential election was shocking.

According to the news, a British company, Cambridge Analytica, took the personal data (big data) of 87 million Facebook users—profiles, friendships, and information about what posts they liked. The company then used AI to analyze the data and create political ads with detailed targeting of voters. It was also revealed that Cambridge Analytica was involved in elections in 68 countries, including Ukraine, to manipulate public opinion. Moreover, the company's micro-marketing method uses big data to understand the individual characteristics and political leanings of voters that cannot be grasped by humans. While the ads that appear on social networking sites do not determine which party a voter will vote for, they can foster anger and anxiety without the voter even realizing it. However, they can foster anger and fear and influence voting behavior without the voter being aware of it. This destroys the principle of democracy, in which each individual participates in political decision-making.

How to view the January 2021 incident in which Trump supporters stormed the U.S. Capitol has attracted the interest of sociologists and political scientists, but this is a question in an area that has yet to be clarified. One hypothesis is that the people who stormed the U.S. Capitol may not have been aware that they were doing so and that the anger and anxiety they fostered may have influenced their voting behaviour, resulting in such manners. In the United States, AI and social networks have come to influence elections, the very foundation of democracy, and Trump lost the 2020 presidential election to Biden and left the White House. This election is reminiscent of the case of ancient Athenian *Ostracism*, in which citizens elected their pretenders to exile from the country. Just as in *Ostracism*, civil rights were restored after a period of time, and it is an open question whether Trump will return for the 2024 presidential election.

Democracy and Tyranny in the Digital Age

Figure 1

Figure 1 shows the countries that participated in the Democracy Summit held on the web on December 9–10, 2021, at the invitation of President Biden. In red were the countries that were invited, and in white were the uninvited. In red are the countries that recognize democracy as a national value, such as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, while the shaded countries, such as China and Russia, are so-called non-democratic countries. The shaded countries are called despotic or authoritarian states, and unlike democracies, which require universal suffrage and a multi-party system, many of them are non-democracies and have a military, monarchy, or one-party dictatorship as their political system. In the future, the division and confrontation between the former (democratic states) led by the U.S. and the latter (despotic states) led by China are expected to become the basic axis of world affairs.

In today's digital age, what is the geopolitical view of democracy and tyranny? It is about democracy and human rights. After the 911 terrorist attacks and the Iraq war, the U.S. tried to implement the Middle East Democratization Program Plan, a plan to democratize a group of authoritarian regimes, but this plan has all but failed, and the Middle East is in chaos. In particular, Syria and Iraq and their border areas are now in a very chaotic state. Now, the U.S. is trying again to promote democratic diplomacy, especially in East Asia.   As for data nationalism and cyber sovereignty, the "Great Wall of China," which was filtering at the gateway, brought the principle

of the "Westphalian regime," a sovereign state that has supreme authority to control domestic events in cyberspace.

Emerging Digital Tyranny Countries

The current conflict between the United States and China has been called the "Sino-American New Cold War. In fact, during the Cold War between the two countries, values of conflict over democracy and human rights were fought in a mirror world consisting of both the cyber and real worlds, unlike the traditional confrontation between nations or the ideological confrontation. In this rivalry, China is introducing low-priced 5G smartphones and base stations to African and Asian countries participating in China's One Belt, One Road initiative. These countries are called the emerging digital tyranny group. The political leaders of these countries have established national control systems in the form of CCTV and data censorship, and their structures are said to be technologically more advanced than those of the United States, Europe, and Japan. Following Wittfogel's "hydraulic management societies," I would call them "information management societies."

In terms of economic and population growth, these developing countries may be able to achieve economic growth through digital technology, while the developed countries of the U.S., Europe, and Japan are facing structural problems of aging and declining populations, and their national power is declining. In this case, the emerging digital nations may set the standards for the next generation in terms of technology and values, and the new Cold War between the U.S. and China may tilt toward China's dominance.

How do we look at the geopolitical dynamics of economic growth in emerging digital nations like China and Africa? First, China's national credit system and BATH-Chinese IT platformers such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei, as described in "The Dawn of the Digital Dictatorship," published in Foreign Affairs Report, a diplomatic journal published by the Council on Foreign Relations of the United States (March 2020), Andrea Kendall-Taylor analyzes that the

Beijing model collects vast amounts of data, from individual and corporate tax refunds to bank statements, shopping history, criminal records, and medical records, which are then analyzed by AI (artificial intelligence) to create and manage social credit scores for individuals and companies.

As published in Foreign Affairs Report, a diplomatic journal published by the Council on Foreign Relations of the United States (March 2020), "The Dawn of Digital Dictatorship" described China's national credit system and BATH-Chinese IT platformers such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei. Andrea Kendall-Taylor argues that the Beijing model collects vast amounts of data, from individual and corporate tax refunds to bank statements, shopping history, criminal records, and medical records, which are then analyzed by AI (artificial intelligence) to create and manage social credit scores for individuals and companies.

Depending on this social credit score, renting an apartment, for example, can become cheaper and more convenient. Then they build the Great Firewall (Digital Great Wall) so that you can only use the Internet within that Internet system, and anti-establishment content is removed from it. The Chinese government and BATH (Chinese IT platformer) operate this Beijing model. This Beijing model is not limited to one country, China, but has been transplanted to emerging digital statehouses in Africa and elsewhere (Taylor (2020)). As for the thesis that "digitization drives democratization," there has been a shift from optimism in the zero's to pessimism in the 10's and 20's. Although citizen communication through social networking sites played a major role in the anti-government protests by citizens of Middle Eastern countries known as the "Arab Spring" in the past, today's digital authoritarian states often have the government side using big data or AI to monitor citizens.

In the past, authoritarian state regimes hired as well as trained spies to monitor traditional threats—military elites and government officials—but this was very costly. In contrast, big data and AI surveillance technologies have now advanced to the point where dictatorships are able to automatically monitor and track popular rebel movements in a much more non-intrusive way than ever before. These African authoritarian regimes have transplanted the Beijing model of the most advanced countries in the field of digital repression technology to their own countries, adopting

Chinese smartphone-based equipment such as Huawei for hardware. In today's digital authoritarian states, the government ~~side~~ often uses big data/AI to monitor its citizens.

Color Revolutions

The "color revolutions" of citizens against the regimes since the end of the Cold War (1989 Czech Velvet Revolution, 2003 Georgia Rose Revolution, 2004 Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2005 Kyrgyzstan Tulip Revolution) were successful in Christian East-Central Europe. The Arab Spring (2010 Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, etc.) was successful in ~~democratization~~ democratizing projects in the Islamic world, but it did not spread to the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, resulting in the "Arab Winter" in the Middle Eastern countries, including the rise of ISIL. In China, the "Umbrella Revolution" (2014) in Hong Kong failed, and the white paper movement against the Xi administration's zero-corruption policy has subsided.

"Chinese Style Democracy."

The Xi Jinping administration does not reject "democracy" per se. Rather, it claims that China has created a Chinese-style democracy rather than directly imitating the Western democratic model. As a matter of fact, the Xi Jinping government points out that humanity's quest for and practice of democracy will never stop and criticizes the idea that the real obstacle to humanity's democratic enterprise is not differences in democratic models but arrogance, prejudice, and hostility toward other countries' democratic aspirations and the way they impose their own models on other countries. In response to the Democracy Summit hosted by President Biden, the Chinese government issued a white paper on democracy.

What should be considered here is what kind of social principle is Confucianism, the social principle of China and Taiwan, the influence of which can be said to exist in East Asian countries such as North and South Korea, Singapore, and Japan. And in terms of democracy, how can it be

compared with Christianity and democracy, or Islam and democracy? Zhai Xuewei, in his book *The Logic of Chinese Behaviors*, uses the gourd model to describe Chinese society as follows:

Zhai Xuewei, *The Logic of Chinese Behaviors*

Figure 2 The 'gourd' (or 'Hourglass')model: the social structure and political world of the Chinese

Democracy is a political system in which rulers are chosen through elections, whereas Confucianism (here, in my terminology, Confucian/cracy) is a system in which the ruler or elite is assumed by name and reputation, without elections.

Is democracy of "Western" origin?

Are people in liberal democratic nations free, and should countries that share these values be prepared for cyberattacks and other types of attacks from countries of concern? Are the values of democracy, freedom, and human rights, especially the core concept of democracy, a Western concept or a concept of Western origin?

Graeber, the anthropologist who wrote Debt, presents the antithesis of this idea in his "On the Non-Western Origins of Democracy. According to him, what he says about democracy is that it is a Western concept, and that its history begins in ancient Athens.

In other words, since Athens' democracy has been represented by Rome, then by Western countries, and now by the United States, it has inherited this Western civilization and democratic civilization from Greece and Rome, which represents the United States in its confrontation with Asia and the non-European world, or the non-European world in its confrontation with Western and American democracy.

Is there any legitimacy to the view that the U.S. should confront Asia and the non-European world, or that the non-European world should support the growth of societies into Western-style American democracies? Graeber continues: They, the ones who talk about democracy, are the politicians of the 18th and 19th centuries. In other words, the modern democratic revolution symbolized by the French Revolution and the American Revolutionary War was essentially the same as the Greek and Roman democracies.

However, Graeber explains that none of these claims can be justified. Ancient Athens was a militaristic, slave-owning society based on a political system of decision-making in a society based on the institutional oppression of women and the forced grafting of liberal democracy since ~~that~~ the French Revolution and the American Revolution. This grafting was ~~a~~ fragile ~~one~~. Democratic practices and egalitarian decision-making processes can be effective at times. While they often produce better results than dictatorships, this system occurs almost everywhere. For example, it can be found in an African tribe, in Asia, or anywhere else, and it is not limited to being of Athenian origin. Thus, democratic practice is not unique to any particular civilization or tradition, and it occurs wherever human life operates outside of a coercive institutional structure (Graeber (2020:7-14,117)).

Democracy, egalitarianism, and the state are inherently contradictory. Over the past 200 years, Democrats have attempted to graft various ideals of popular self-government onto the coercive apparatus of the state, however, such attempts do not work. The state, by its very nature,

can never be truly democratized. In short, the state is basically nothing more than a means of organizing violence. On the other hand, the French Revolution and the American War of Independence, to which Graeber just referred, are typically described by Francis Fukuyama, a neo-conservative thinker.

Deriving from Kojève's interpretation of Hegel, he believed that this contradiction between master and slave, which could only be recognized as flawed, was added by the French Revolution and finally overcome by the American Revolution. The French Revolution and the American Revolution of Independence swept away the distinction between master and slave, transforming the former slave into his own master and establishing the principles of popular sovereignty and the rule of law. This was liberal democracy as the Western tradition in America's heritage, and it was to legitimize America's will to "go west" (Manifest Destiny).

Confucian Democracy

Confucianism (here, in my terminology, Confucian/cracy) is a system in which rulers or elites are assumed by name and credit, without elections. Fukuyama describes the flogging of Michael Day, an American student, by Singaporean authorities in 1994 for vandalism, which highlights the challenge that Asian societies pose to the U.S. and other Western democracies. Are Confucianism and Western-style democracy fundamentally incompatible? Will Asia create a new political and economic order that is fundamentally different from Western capitalist democracy? In fact, Confucianism and democracy are less compatible than many in Asia and the West believe, so the essence of postwar "modernization theory" is correct. Economic development tends to be followed by political liberalization. If the rapid economic development that Asia has experienced in recent years continues, democratization in the region will continue. Ultimately, however, the contours of Asian democracy may be very different from contemporary American democracy, which has experienced serious problems reconciling individual rights with the interests of the larger community.

Cyber Democracy

Currently, private corporations and government censorship, cyberattacks, fake news, and privacy compromise civil liberties such as freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and privacy. This paper examines the reality of the crisis of social and political openness (cyber democracy) in the online space that citizens and internet companies should enjoy and the multi-stakeholders should realize.

Based on Bruno Latour's ANT, actor-network theory discusses the India-Pacific and the nature of democracy in online space in societies with Confucian cultural principles differ from Western cultural principles. Multi-stakeholderism does not assume that government policy alone can complete the process, but rather that organizations and individuals from different positions in society, such as businesses, consumers, investors, workers, and NPOs, participate in the multi-stakeholder process, cooperate, and play their respective roles. The organizations and individuals that hold the key to solving these problems are called "stakeholders". A "multi-stakeholder process" is a consensus-building framework in which a wide variety of stakeholders participate on an equal footing and work together to solve problems.

Will technological modification transform the state of society? If it is citizens, not governments or corporations, who will be the main actors in changing society itself for the better.

In the 2020s and 30s, cyberspace will expand quantitatively and qualitatively, even dominating real space. The rules of the mirror world consisting of both cyberspace and real space are the "law of the jungle," i.e., the law of the jungle is the law of the jungle. Despite the phrase "it will be so convenient," the arrival of this society makes people anxious. The more comfortable we are with Internet-based searching, shopping, and community, the more individuals worry about privacy breaches, the more they balk at the government's call to register for a personal number card, and the more companies are forced to spend huge sums of money defending against cyber-attacks. Could there be a safer, more secure, and freer cyber society?

Due to the advancement of digital twin technologies, people's necessities such as medical care, health, (e-)government, (automated) driving, communication, and disaster prevention, as well as defense infrastructures, are mutually transforming, requiring a pluralistic and stable order formation in cyberspace and a human perspective that can respond to these changes. To respond to this challenge, this paper will discuss how democratic politics and human values will change in cyberspace and what the core norms of ethics, human values, and human rights, as well as democracy and fair governance based on these concepts, should be as standards originating from Asia. This session will explore the various forms of acceptance of digital technology by different Asian societies, which share many similarities with Japanese culture, in order to identify the direction of symbiosis.

In the philosophical and ethical part, we will explore the modern and international values of the Kyoto School, which are universal in the sense that they were formed when Asian societies encountered modern Western civilization. It establishes new norms and values originating from Asia through multidisciplinary research in Japanese and Asian philosophical humanities and raises new ethical values such as how far technology can and should be involved in "human" affairs. We will create a social design for the quantum world and human beings after the coming of the singularity (the sudden technological evolution of interactive technologies such as quantum computing, AI, space, and optical communications) expected around the 2030s.

The fundamental principle of individuals proving and certifying their "identity" in cyberspace as their own entities rather than being approved by external entities such as IT platforms or the government must be realized. In an environment where this is recognized, the problem of leakage and falsification of personal information does not exist in principle, and there is no concern about top-down demands for digital information submission, which is a peculiarity of this environment. Therefore, the integration of individuals into the cyber world is expected to advance dramatically, which will further accelerate the fusion of cyberspace and real space and can be a catalyst for disruptive innovation. It is a technology that makes it possible to secure the fundamental human rights of individuals without their freedom being taken away by others.

The "Right of Certification" (Sakade, Takeshi (ed.) (2021) *Cyber Democracy* (Kyoto University),issue-01) is the foundation of these human rights. It has the right to be recognized as one's self without relying on third parties and not to have one's right to recognition taken away or restricted by third parties (extending social rights and survival rights). Based on this recognition, there are two other rights: the "Right of Expression," to express one's will and imagination, and the "Right of Decision," to decide on matters concerning oneself.

In order to chart a course for the establishment of democracy and order in cyberspace, local governments should establish different rights such as the right to authentication (the right to prove one's identity), the right to expression (the right to express one's will and imagination), and the right to decision (the right to decide matters concerning one's self) as basic human rights in cyberspace prior to DXing at the central government level (the right to decide matters concerning oneself) as fundamental human rights in cyberspace. It seems that all people today are concerned about the issue of privacy in cyberspace. They seem to be afraid of their own privacy leaks in cyberspace. In exchange for convenience, can we just sit back and let our private information become a source of profit for advertisers? The "digital enclosure" of personal information in cyberspace is underway. This is the logic of creating a vector for denying the dictatorship of cyberspace based on Hajime Tanabe's *Logic of Species* (the formation of a connective layer of "species" regional autonomous space that is the middle term between the universal (cyberspace) and (the individual). Isn't it possible, through the construction of a "species" hierarchy, to construct an order of freedom in a mirror world consisting of cyberspace and real space?

In the cyberspace transformation, which is being expanded and layered based on 5G and beyond 5G communication standards, securing individual rights as well as democratic elements based on natural rights (cyber democracy) is seen as an issue. To respond to the challenges of democracy in cyberspace, this study examines the codes of conduct and cyber-related treaties necessary for the evolution and expansion of democratic government. The giant IT companies are the government framework regulation of cyber platform operators to ensure that these technologies are accepted by society and that the weak are not excluded.

At the same time, we will consider measures to achieve social inclusion that does not exclude the vulnerable, as society accepts these technologies. In contrast to the various norms in cyberspace that have been led by Europe and the United States, we will establish norms as standards originating from Asia by incorporating Asian perspectives, even going back to the Kyoto School of Thought, and contribute to the formation of a pluralistic and stable order in cyberspace in 21st-century society.

In digital technology, dramatic innovations are transforming the functions and values of traditional society. In Society 5.0 and Mirror World history, it has been widely discussed that a new level of reunification of digital space and real space will arrive in the near future. However, there is still no clear vision of the norms required for such an interface society, despite the high demand for such norms from government and business. There is an urgent need to examine the ethical, humanistic, and human rights concepts that form the core of the norms, as well as the nature of democracy and just governance based on these concepts.

In today's multi-stakeholder processes based on the IoT, not only people but also things are connected in real-time, and the modern dichotomy of "subject-object" ("society-nature") is in the process of being broken down. Actor-Network Theory is effective in this regard, as Bruno Latour assumes that humans are not pure "subjects", non-humans are not pure "objects", and certain actions and behaviors cannot be reduced to subjects or objects but are created in the context of a series of quasi-subjects and quasi-objects. Technology makes it possible to secure the basic human rights of individuals without their freedom being taken away by others.

The "Right of Certification" (Sakade, Takeshi (ed.) (2021) *Cyber Democracy* (Kyoto University),issue-01) is the foundation of these human rights, that is, the right to be recognized as one's self without relying on a third party, and the right not to have one's right to recognition removed or restricted by a third party (extension of social rights and the right to life). Prior to DXing at the central government level, local governments will consider the rights of authentication, expression, and decision-making as fundamental human rights in cyberspace.

A Proposal

There are three possible paths for the international privacy regime: 1) Europe-EU data regulation; 2) USA-Amazon AWS and "GAFA+Tesla"; 3) China-Great Fire Wall (Digital Great Wall). These are the possible paths: Possible scenarios for the international order of data privacy in cyberspace include Scenario 1: "Convergence to EU standards (GDPR)"; Scenario 2: "Coexistence of competing standards"; and lastly Scenario 3: "Coexistence of data distribution blocs". It is possible that a group of volunteer countries led by the U.S., Europe, and Japan will advocate the creation of international rules for data transactions within the WTO.

To respond to the challenges of democracy in cyberspace, we should consider the codes of conduct and cyber-related treaties necessary for the development and expansion of democratic government. Furthermore, the government's framework for regulating cyber platform operators (giant IT companies) ensures the acceptance of these technologies by society and promotes social and economic development that does not exclude the vulnerable. It is also necessary to consider measures to realize social inclusion that do not exclude the weak while society accepts these technologies by examining a framework for government regulation of cyber platforms (giant IT companies).

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