Forthcoming papers
Furusawa,
Taiji and Naoto Jinji. “Tariff Revenue Competition in
a Free Trade Area: The Case of Asymmetric Large Countries.” Review of Development Economics,
forthcoming.
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Jinji, Naoto.
“International Trade and Renewable Resources under Asymmetries of Resource
Abundance and Resource Management.” Environmental
and Resource Economics, forthcoming
This
paper examines the interaction between relative resource abundance and resource
management regimes in determining trade patterns and gains from trade in a
two-country model with a renewable resource. A model developed by Brander and Taylor
(1997b) is extended. It is shown that
relative resource abundance determines trade patterns if resource abundance is
similar in both countries and the relative demand for the resource good is
moderate, or if resource abundance is sufficiently different and the relative
demand is not so high. Otherwise, a
difference in resource management regimes determines trade patterns. Even under an open-access regime, the
resource-scarce country gains from trade unless resource abundance is similar
and the relative demand is low.
Keywords: international
trade; open access; relative resource abundance; renewable resources; resource
management regime.
JEL classification: F10, Q20.
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Toshimitsu,
Tsuyoshi and Naoto Jinji. “Quality Differentiation, Welfare, and the Mode of
Competition in a Vertically Differentiated Product Market: A Note.” Japanese Economics Review, forthcoming.
We
analyze the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated
product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice
model. We find that in the cases of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree
of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or
smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second-best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality
difference respectively increases or decreases social welfare in the case of
Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.
JEL Classification: L13, L15,
D43.
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Published papers
Jinji, Naoto.
2006. “International Trade and Terrestrial Open-access Renewable Resources in a
Small Open Economy.” Canadian Journal of
Economics 39(3): 790-808.
In
this paper, I investigate the effects of trade liberalization and policies on
deforestation by extending a small open economy model with open-access
renewable resources developed by Brander and Taylor (1997a). I endogenize the carrying capacity of
the resource. I find that unlike
Brander and Taylor, trade liberalization may increase the forest stock in the
resource abundant country and may decrease the forest stock in the resource
scarce country. Moreover, the
policies primarily aimed at protecting forests, such as import restrictions by
importing countries and forest certification for well-managed forests, may have
perverse effects on the forest stock.
Keywords: terrestrial
renewable resources; deforestation; carrying capacity; base resources; forest
certification; import restrictions.
JEL classification: F10, Q20.
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Jinji, Naoto and Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu. 2006. “Optimal Policy for Product
R&D with Endogenous Quality Ordering: Asymmetric Duopoly.” Australian Economic Papers 45(2):
127-140.
We
examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically
differentiated duopoly. In a
significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of
asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap
between firms. In our analysis, the
endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We demonstrate the possible
anti-leapfrogging effect of R&D subsidy/tax policy. By committing to a firm-specific subsidy schedule contingent on firms'
quality choices, the government can not only correct distortions in product
quality but also select the socially preferred equilibrium. The latter role is fulfilled by
preventing the technologically inferior firm from becoming a quality leader in
the industry. Both Bertrand and
Cournot cases are analyzed.
Keywords: asymmetric
duopoly; endogenous quality ordering; product R&D; R&D policy; vertical
product differentiation.
JEL classification: L10, L52.
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Higashida,
Keisaku and Naoto Jinji. 2006. “Strategic Use of Recycled Content Standards
under International Duopoly.” Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 51(2): 242-257.
We
examine the strategic use of recycled content standards (RCSs) under
international duopoly. RCSs require
firms supplying the domestic market to use a certain proportion of recycled
materials as inputs. We demonstrate
that, when there is no trade in recycled materials, two identical countries
both set strategically stricter or laxer RCSs. However, when there is trade in recycled
materials, it may be the case that one country sets a stricter RCS while the
other sets a laxer RCS. When a world supply constraint on recycled materials is
not binding, the main source of the asymmetric distortion in RCSs is a demand effect for recycled materials.
Keywords: recycling;
recycled content standard; international trade; strategic trade policy.
JEL classification: F12; F13;
F18.
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Jinji, Naoto.
2004. “Endogenous Timing in a Vertically
Differentiated Duopoly with Quantity Competition.” Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 45: 119-127.
This
paper examines the endogenous choice of timing in a vertically differentiated
duopoly with fixed cost of quality improvement when firms compete in quantities
in the market. Using an extended
game with observable delay, it is shown that when firms can choose the timing
of quality choice, simultaneous play equilibria arise. By contrast, when firms can choose their
relative positions in the quality space before deciding the timing, the game
yields sequential play equilibria in which the low quality firm moves first and
the high quality firm moves second.
Keywords: endogenous
timing; quality choice; quantity competition; vertical product differentiation.
JEL classification: D43, L13.
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Jinji, Naoto and Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu. 2004. “Minimum Quality Standards
under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 26(2):
189-199.
In
this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated
duopoly. We generalize the model in
Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost
of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of
quality ordering. In the
generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and
Valletti (2000) are largely robust.
Keywords: asymmetric duopoly, endogenous quality
ordering, minimum quality standards, vertical product differentiation
JEL classification: L13, L15, L52
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Jinji, Naoto.
2003. “Strategic Mandatory Labelling of Biotechnology
Products in the Absence of Quality Difference.” International Trade Journal 17(4): 305-320.
This
paper examines the strategic use of mandatory labelling of biotechnology
products, such as genetically modified food. A foreign dominant firm produces a
biotechnology product and foreign competitive firms produce a conventional one.
It is shown that if other trade measures such as tariffs are also available,
the government of an importing country may impose mandatory labelling even in
the case where there is no quality difference between biotechnology and
conventional products. A combination of a discriminatory tariff on the
biotechnology product and mandatory labelling shifts rents from the foreign
dominant firm to the domestic economy.
Keywords: labelling; strategic trade policy; credence
goods; biotechnology; genetically modified food; process attribute.
JEL classification: F12; F13; L15; Q17.
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Jinji, Naoto.
2003. “Strategic Policy for Product R&D with Symmetric Costs.” Canadian Journal
of Economics 36(4): 993-1006.
This
paper examines strategic policy for product R&D in an international duopoly
where domestic and foreign firms are identical. It is shown that strategic R&D
policy is described by a menu of subsidy schedule contingent on firms' quality
choices. Unilateral policy enables
its domestic firm to produce a high quality product, making equilibrium outcome
unique. With two active
governments, in equilibrium they implement different subsidy schedules. Two equilibrium outcomes exist, which
are identical except for the identity of the countries. Thus, both countries have an equal chance
to become the high quality exporter.
Bertrand and Cournot cases are both examined.
Keywords: endogenous
quality ordering, product R&D, strategic trade policy, vertical
differentiation.
JEL classification: F12, F13.
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Updated: October 3, 2006