京都大学 大学院経済学研究科・経済学部

SEMINAR SERIES

Management Seminar

Edward Freeman/ Randall Mork(Professor, University of Virginia/ Professor, Alberta School of Business, respectively )

Date&Time:
2026.7.6 (Mon) 9:30-11:30
Venue:
Inamori Hall in Shiran-Kaikan, Graduate School of Medicine and Faculty of Medicine, Kyoto University.
Language:
English
Contact:
Asli M. COLPAN

(title):

【Report①】”Stakeholder Capitalism and Corporate Governance”

【Report②】”Corporate Governance for the Social Good”

 

Abstract :

①There is a debate about whether stakeholder capitalism is consistent with both the law of corporations and corporate practice.  Or, is stakeholder capitalism simply “virtue signaling” or worse.  We offer a preliminary answer to this debate.  We first define stakeholder capitalism in realistic terms as connected to the business models of companies, if it is to have real meaning.  Second we investigate the corporate governance laws in the G-20 countries to see whether or not these laws are consistent with stakeholder capitalism.  Third we investigate corporate practice in these same countries.  As you might expect the answer is mixed, however, we find much more support for stakeholder capitalism than perhaps the mainstream corporate governance literature would suggest.

②Debate about whether corporations are better run to make profits or to advance social welfare is as old as stock markets. Earlier debates on this issue are remarkable for their depth and economic literacy, and knowledge of them could greatly elevate our current discussions. Over the past centuries, the pendulum has swung back and forth several times, with right and left-leaning advocates often switching sides, and seeing one's views espoused by one's ideological foes can instill perspective. Sorting through these historical debates suggests a way forward - corporate governance success measured by productivity-enhancing profits, but achieved by competing for the genuine esteem of customers, employees, other stakeholders, and the public at large. Pathologies arise because whenever profits become the goal of corporate governance, they become a less useful measure of good governance.

 

If you would like to participate in this seminar, please register yourself from the weblink below:

https://forms.gle/smGRwmg6WRVRpGdw9

Contact: cgir2026[at]mail2.adm.kyoto-u.ac.jp (Please replace [at] with @)