京都大学 大学院経済学研究科・経済学部

Tomoya Kazumura

• Activity Database on Education and Research

Basic Information

• Academic Degrees:

  Ph.D. in Economics, Osaka University

• Courses in charge:

  
  

  [Undergraduate]

  Readings in Humanities and Social Sciences
  

  [Graduate] Mechanism Design

• Fields of Research:

  Mechanism design, Microeconomics

• Keywords:

  Auction theory, Matching theory

Selected Publications

• “Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences,” (with Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa) Journal of Economic Theory, 188, 2020.
• “Mechanism design without quasilinearity,” (with Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa) Theoretical Economics, 15, 511–544, 2020.
• “Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences,” (with Shigehiro Serizawa) Social Choice and Welfare, 47, 633–663, 2016.

Membership of Professional Organizations

• Econometric Society
• Japanese Economic Association