京都大学 大学院経済学研究科・経済学部

(Title):  "The Parental Investment Rat Race"
 

Abstract:　

Competition for limited seats in prestigious colleges generates a "rat-race" equilibrium effect, driving demand for parental investment. Using admissions cutoffs, I document that attending a more prestigious college tier yields a substantial initial income premium controlling for college entrance exam scores, with this gap widening over the lifecycle. I develop and estimate a dynamic tournament model where each household chooses tutoring quality, tutoring hours, and student self-study hours. The model explains persistently high educational investment despite modest effects on test score, as students maintain investment to avoid dropping to lower tiers. Using the estimated model, I find that substantial portion of tutoring is driven by the competition channel. Counterfactual analysis shows expanding elite college seats improves household welfare through reducing amount of tutoring expenditure and times.