京都大学 大学院経済学研究科・経済学部

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Senior Lecturer

Basic Information
  • Academic Degrees:
    Ph.D. in Economics, Osaka University
  • Courses in charge:

    [Undergraduate]
    Readings in Humanities and Social Sciences
    [Graduate] Mechanism Design
  • Fields of Research:
    Mechanism design, Microeconomics
  • Keywords:
    Auction theory, Matching theory
Selected Publications
  • “Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences,” (with Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa) Journal of Economic Theory, 188, 2020.
  • “Mechanism design without quasilinearity,” (with Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa) Theoretical Economics, 15, 511–544, 2020.
  • “Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences,” (with Shigehiro Serizawa) Social Choice and Welfare, 47, 633–663, 2016.
Membership of Professional Organizations
  • Econometric Society
  • Japanese Economic Association
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