京都大学 大学院経済学研究科・経済学部

【①報告】”Tough Call for Directors to Remain in or Exit Fraudulent Boards: Conflict Among Three Identities in Their Decisions”

【②報告】”Political Stability, Economic Policy Uncertainty, and High-Growth SMEs in Europe: The Role of Managerial Political Action Values”

Abstract:
①　Knowledge regarding why directors exit their company boards following corporate fraud remains limited. Specifically, this relationship has not been empirically tested using identity theory, despite its significance to broader stakeholders. In this study, we proposed three identities relevant to outside directors: two personal identities, one derived from their full-time profession and the other from being a director, and a social or group-based identity as a member of a specific board. Using panel data of 20,672 outside directors of Japanese listed firms between 2010 and 2020, we then investigated the effect of outside directors’ identities on their exit-or-remain decisions following fraud, with finer granularity by fraud types and directors’ resource-dependent roles. The results revealed that fraud, particularly severe fraud, is associated with high levels of director exit. Moreover, outside directors at prestigious firms are more likely to leave compared to those at less prestigious firms. Furthermore, outside directors who are business experts tend to remain and help the firm out of the crisis, unlike directors with non-business backgrounds such as specialists and community influentials. This study extends identity theory in the organizational crisis context by demonstrating how personal and social identities determine director exit from fraudulent firms.

②　This study investigates how political stability (PS), economic policy uncertainty (EPU), and directors’ political-action values (PAV) jointly influence the likelihood that European small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) become high-growth firms (HGFs). Using panel regression models that track firms over more than a decade (2011-2022), we find that a stable political environment significantly increases the odds of rapid employment expansion, whereas heightened policy uncertainty reduces them. Managerial orientation also plays a pivotal role. Boards whose members exhibit strong norms of conventional political engagement are more effective in converting stability into higher growth and in mitigating much of the drag created by uncertainty. These interaction effects suggest that politically active leadership teams serve as strategic complements to favorable institutional conditions and as partial buffers when policy signals become volatile. A series of robustness analyses confirm the consistency of these relationships across endogeneity tests, alternative growth definition, and sample restrictions. The findings contribute to the academic literature on institutional determinants of firm performance by highlighting the combined importance of country-level governance and firm-level political capital. The results highlight the importance of politically engaged leadership for managers and entrepreneurs, and the value of stability and clarity for policymakers seeking to foster high growth SMEs. Overall, the study offers actionable insights for researchers, business leaders, and policymakers aiming to promote dynamic enterprise growth across Europe.

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