セミナーシリーズ
アジア経済発展論研究会セミナー（2025.10.7）
Madhav Aney（Associate Professor at Singapore Management University）
- 開催日：
- 2025年10月7日（火）10:30-12:00
- 場所：
- 京都大学吉田キャンパス 法経済学部東館1階 101演習室
- 言語：
- 英語
- コーディネーター：
- 高野 久紀
“Constitutional Adjudication in the Age of Majority Governments: Measuring the Erosion of Judicial Independence in India”
Abstract:
In 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi strode into office in New Delhi with an imperial majority. After three decades of minority cabinets and wobbly coalitions, India resumed its tryst with majority governments. Did this sudden parliamentary transition (adversely) impact the Indian Supreme Court’s approach to adjudication? A large body of comparative literature in political science frames judicial power as a strategic seesaw. Parliamentary strength dictates
judges’ performance, it claims. Judicial power swells against minority governments but shrinks against majority ones. Does this apply to India, too? We summon a dataset of Supreme Court cases involving the Indian government over two decades (1999-2019) to investigate this. India witnessed four cabinets in this period: three were minority/coalition and one was majority. Our findings challenge the seesaw conception of judicial power. In non-constitutional and “super” constitutional cases, the Supreme Court, we find, has not shrunk during Prime Minister Modi’s term. But the court has exhibited a bias towards his government in “ordinary” constitutional cases. These nuanced findings underscore the need for vigilance. But obituaries of judicial independence in India, increasingly routine in the media, are premature.
judges’ performance, it claims. Judicial power swells against minority governments but shrinks against majority ones. Does this apply to India, too? We summon a dataset of Supreme Court cases involving the Indian government over two decades (1999-2019) to investigate this. India witnessed four cabinets in this period: three were minority/coalition and one was majority. Our findings challenge the seesaw conception of judicial power. In non-constitutional and “super” constitutional cases, the Supreme Court, we find, has not shrunk during Prime Minister Modi’s term. But the court has exhibited a bias towards his government in “ordinary” constitutional cases. These nuanced findings underscore the need for vigilance. But obituaries of judicial independence in India, increasingly routine in the media, are premature.